Dempster -Shafer theory allows to construct belief functions from (precise) basic probability assignments. The present paper extends this idea substantially. By considering sets of basic probability assignments, an appealing constructive approach to general interval probability is achieved, which allows for a very flexible modelling of uncertain knowledge.
Introduction and sketch of the argument
In order to model complex uncertain knowledge appropriately, generalizations of the notion of probability and its mathematical formalization have attracted considerable attention (see, e.g. Bernhard et al. (2003) , Kjaerulff and Meek (2003) , and the SIPTA webpage (2005) . Most popular, in particular in artificial intelligence, is the Dempster -Shafer theory of belief functions (Shafer (1976) , cf. also e.g. Yager et al. (1994) ). Though belief functions are only a special case of general interval probability or imprecise probabilities (e.g. Walley (1991) , Weichselberger (2001) ), they are particularly attractive, because they can elegantly be constructed from information which is not strong enough to divide the whole probability mass among the singletons only. The beliefs in events need not be assigned a priori, but can be calculated by accumulating the corresponding basic probability numbers.
The present paper extends this appealing construction principle substantially. Generalized basic probability assignments are introduced that lead to lower and upper probabilities, providing a vivid constructive approach to general interval probability.
The basic idea of this new concept arises naturally from a closer investigation of the mathematical apparatus behind the Dempster -Shafer framework. (In the sequel, let PðVÞ be the power set of some sample space V and P › ðVÞ U PðPðVÞÞ:) Formally, Shafer's constructive approach to interval probability on a measurable space (V, PðVÞ) is equivalent to assigning a classical probability measure on the "higher-level" measurable space ðPðVÞ; P › ðVÞÞ, and the basic probability assignment is merely the corresponding probability mass function. This will be generalized here by allowing for a set S of mass functions, called generalized basic probability assignments. By calculating the envelope of all belief functions generated by elements of S general interval probability is obtained. A variety of rather different situations can be modelled by adapting methods for handling sets of mass functions (like Kofler and Menges (1976) or Weichselberger and Pöhlmann (1990) ) as techniques for dealing with generalized basic probability assignments. For instance, partial orderings on the basic probability numbers can be considered.
Technically, belief functions are closely related to multi-valued mappings (e.g. Nguyen (1978) ), and so the approach taken here is to some extent allied to recent work by Miranda et al. (2002 Miranda et al. ( , 2005 , who elaborate Walley's (1991, p. 182f .) idea of multi-valued mappings with imprecise probabilities.
The paper is organized as follows: It starts with collecting some basic notions needed later concerning general interval probability and the Dempster -Shafer approach. In Section 3 the concept of generalized basic probability assignments is introduced, motivated and formalized, and some of its fundamental properties are investigated. In particular, Theorem 3.2 proves that this new concept fits nicely into the frame of general interval probability, and Theorem 3.6 is concerned with efficient calculation in the general case where convexity can be assumed. Section 4 sketches the possible range of modelling by considering some attractive special cases.
Interval probability and belief functions
The usual concept of probability as formalized by Kolmogorov's axioms requires a level of precision and-by the axiom of additivity-a degree of internal consistency of the assignments which often cannot be satisfied. To model more complex uncertainty appropriately, different theories of interval probability have emerged, where an interval [L(A),U(A)] is assigned to every event to describe its probability.
With respect to the intended application, the whole consideration is restricted here to the case of a finitely generated algebra A based on a sample space V. Then, without loss of generality, V is finite, and A is the power set PðVÞ. Every probability measure in the usual sense, i.e. every set function p(·) satisfying Kolmogorov's axioms, is called a classical probability. The set of all classical probabilities on the measurable space (V, PðVÞ) will be denoted by CðV; PðVÞÞ: Then, as in equations (1) -(3) below, axioms for interval-valued probabilities P(·) ¼ [L(·),U(·)] can be obtained by looking at the relation between the setfunctions L(·) and U(·) and the set of classical probabilities being in accordance with them.
On a finite sample space, the most important concepts of interval probability coincide. They are all concerned with set-functions 
Such P(·), and the corresponding set functions L(·) and U(·), are called lower and upper probability (Huber and Strassen 1973) , envelopes (Walley and Fine 1982, Denneberg 1994) , coherent probability (Walley 1991) and F-probability (Weichselberger (1995 (Weichselberger ( , 2000 (Weichselberger ( , 2001 ). In game theory M is the core (Shapley 1971) . Here Weichselberger's terminology is used, calling M the structure of the F-probability P(·).
For every F-probability, L(·) and U(·) are conjugate, i.e. UðAÞ ¼ 1 2 LðA c Þ; ;A [ PðVÞ: Therefore, every F-probability is uniquely determined either by L(·) or by U(·) alone. Here L(·) is used throughout, and F ¼ ðV; PðVÞ; Lð·ÞÞ is called an F-probability field. Specifying an F-probability field ðV; PðVÞ; Lð·ÞÞ; it is implicitly required that the conjugate set function U(·) ¼ 1 2 L(· c ) describes the upper bound of the interval. Moreover, it can be shown (e.g. Weichselberger (2001, p. 153) ) that on finite spaces M is a convex polyhedron and the infima and suprema in equations (2) 
A characteristic special case of F-probability is considered in the Dempster -Shafer approach. † There, a function Belð·Þ : PðVÞ ! ½0; 1 with BelðYÞ ¼ 0 and Bel(V) ¼ 1 is called a belief function, if it is n-monotone for all n [ N; i.e. if it satisfies
for all n-tuples of events A 1 ,. . ., A n . Typically belief functions are constructed from basic probability assignments on ðV; PðVÞÞ; i.e. via functions mð·Þ : PðVÞ ! R with
The basic probability number m(A) is interpreted as the weight one gives to that part of the information which points solely to A and cannot be divided among proper subsets of A. Every basic probability assignment m(·) generates a belief function Bel m (·) (and vice versa). The total belief in A is obtained by accumulating all basic probability numbers committed to † There is quite a couple of approaches, which differ in interpretation but use the same mathematical techniques, namely totally monotone capacities. The argument presented below is technically situated by generalizing the mathematical basis. It immediately carries over to each of the concretely preferred interpretations. Therefore, in this article, it seems to be not necessary to distinguish between the several approaches relying on totally monotone capacities. For simplicity, Shafer's (1976) vocabulary and the name "Dempster-Shafer theory" is used throughout the paper.
any subset of A:
While every belief function is the lower interval limit of an F-probability, the converse does not hold: Examples of general F-probability, i.e. F-probability not satisfying (6) even for n ¼ 2, can be constructed easily, and so belief functions are often judged to be too restrictive to serve as the basis of a powerful generalization of classical probability theory.
Even more trenchant: As can be seen by rephrasing (8) along the lines of Nguyen (1978, Section 4) , belief functions do not really go beyond the scope of classical probability theory-an observation which will later on also straightforwardly lead to the generalization proposed: Shafer considers the set PðVÞ of all random events as a "higher-level" sample space, uses the basic probability assignment m(·) as a mass function on it, and identifies the total belief in A with the probability of the set-system containing all subsets of A. With p › (·) as the classical probability measure on the measurable space ðPðVÞ; P › ðVÞÞ corresponding to m(·) via
one obtains for the corresponding belief function Bel m (·):
and so a belief function on (V, PðVÞ) is nothing else but the restriction of a classical probability measure on ðPðVÞ; P › ðVÞÞ to those events which can be written as the power set of subsets of V. This one-to-one correspondence between belief functions and classical probability measures has a clear-but often forgotten-consequence. Using belief functions implicitly means that one relies on the assumption that the available information could be adequately quantified by a single classical probability measure on ðPðVÞ; P › ðVÞÞ: In many situations, especially in situations of uncertain knowledge, this is much more than one can honestly require. Therefore an appropriate generalization is highly desirable.
Generalized basic probability assignments

The basic idea
In Dempster -Shafer theory modelling uncertain knowledge, on the one hand, and its quantification by a single basic probability assignment, on the other hand, are seen as Siamese twins, but the discussion above shows that this is not necessary. The quite attractive feature of belief functions, which is to be constructed from evidence that is not distributed among the singletons only, is due to a change of the sample space from V to PðVÞ; but not at all to the assignment of a single mass function on it. Separating both aspects, the generalization suggests itself: change the sample space, but permit a more flexible modelling by sets of basic probability assignments! Note that by this generalization the flexibility of modelling is enriched substantially; these sets can be gained not only by enumeration of their elements but may also be constructed from weaker quantified information (see Section 4.2f.).
Every basic probability assignment generates a belief function, and so a set of basic probability assignments generates a set of belief functions. A natural way to handle this set is to assign to every event its infimal belief, i.e. to consider the envelope of all these belief functions. It will be shown that this procedure leads to F-probability.
Formalization of the concept
This informal motivation can be formalized rigorously:
Definition 3.1 (Generalized basic probability assignment). Let ðV; PðVÞÞ be a finite measurable space, and QðV; PðVÞÞ the set of all basic probability assignments on ðV; PðVÞÞ: Every nonempty subset S # QðV; PðVÞÞ is called a generalized basic probability assignment on ðV; PðVÞÞ:
The next theorem embeds generalized basic probability assignments into the theory of general interval probability by showing that generalized belief accumulation leads to F-probability. 
Then F ðSÞ U ðV; PðVÞ; Lð·ÞÞ is an F-probability field.
Proof. This result is essentially based on the general fact that the so-called union of Fprobability fields always produces an F-probability field again ( LðDÞ ¼ inf Before discussing special cases yielding convenient expressions to enable efficient calculation of equation (11), some fundamental properties of the general procedure deserve being mentioned.
Some properties of generalized belief accumulation
The concept of generalized basic probability assignments and generalized belief accumulation serves as a constructive approach to F-probability, rigorously generalizing Dempster -Shafer theory. As a first property note that, directly by construction, the process of belief accumulation "preserves the imprecision": the vaguer the generalized basic probability assignments, i.e. the larger the set S, the larger is, ceteris paribus, the structure of the corresponding F-probability, i.e. the vaguer is the resulting interval probability (This result will also be repeatedly needed in the proofs below).
Proposition 3. Consider two generalized basic probability assignments S 1 and S 2 on ðV; PðVÞÞ; and let M i be the structure of the corresponding F-probability field F ðS i Þ ¼ ðV; PðVÞ; L i ð·ÞÞ; i ¼ 1; 2:
and L 1 ðAÞ $ L 2 ðAÞ; ;A [ PðVÞ:
The correspondence between F-probability and generalized belief accumulation formulated in Theorem 3.2 also holds in the opposite direction: every F-probability field can be obtained by generalized belief accumulation.
Proposition 3.4. For every F-probability field F there is a generalized basic probability assignment S F such that F ¼ F ðS F Þ: Indeed, S F can be chosen to be finite.
Proof. Let M be the structure of F. Then M is a convex polyhedron, with vertices p 1 (·),. . ., p q (·). Now apply the procedure from Theorem 3.2 to the set S ¼ {m 1 ð·Þ; . . .; m q ð·Þ} where, for j ¼ 1,. . ., q, m j (A) U p j (A), if A is a singleton, and m j (A) U 0, else. By construction, F is recovered. A However, several generalized basic probability assignments can lead to the same F-probability field F; as will be shown in Proposition 3.5, passing over to the closure or taking the convex hull does not alter the result. In the sequel every basic probability assignment m(·) is embedded into the R jPðVÞj by identifying it with the jPðVÞj-dimensional vector ðmðAÞÞ A[PðVÞ with some fixed order for the components, and the corresponding standard topology is used.
Proposition 3.5. Consider the situation of Definition 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 with a generalized basic probability assignment S.
(a) Let
S be the closure of S. Then
and in equation (11) is continuous in m(·). Firstly, this yields equation (15). Secondly, note that S , ½0; 1 jPðVÞj is bounded and hence compact. Therefore, l A attains for every A its minimum in an element of S. For Part (b), let L conv ð·Þ be the lower interval limit produced by conv(S). Proposition 3.3 directly gives L conv ðAÞ # LðAÞ for all A [ PðVÞ: For the relation L conv ðAÞ $ LðAÞ note that, by the definition of the convex hull, for every element m(·) of conv(S) there are m 1 (·), . . ., m q (·) in S and l 1 ,. . .,l q $ 0 with P q j¼1 l j ¼ 1 such that mð·Þ ¼ P q j¼1 l j m j ð·Þ: Therefore, for every A [ PðVÞ;
l j LðAÞ ¼ LðAÞ:
Since mð·Þ [ convðSÞ was chosen arbitrarily, passing over to the infimum over all mð·Þ [ convðSÞ does not alter the inequality. This completes the proof. A Many assessment procedures lead naturally to generalized basic probability assignments that are closed and convex (see, for instance, Proposition 3.7 Sections 4.2 and 4.3). In this situation, practical computation can be simplified substantially by the following attractive property:
Theorem 3.6. Let the generalized basic probability assignment S be convex and closed, and EðSÞ be the set of extreme points of S, then F ðSÞ ¼ F ðEðSÞÞ; ð18Þ
and equation (11) On the other hand, to show L E ðAÞ # LðAÞ; note that S is not only closed, but also bounded and hence compact. Moreover, since the mapping l A : R jPðVÞj ! ½0; 1 m 7 ! X B#A mðBÞ is linear and continuous, its restriction on the convex and compact set S attains its minimum at an element of EðSÞ (cf . Holmes (1975, Corollary, p. 74) ). A
The concept developed here allows to use the whole framework of interval probability for expressing uncertain knowledge on indivisible evidence in the higher level sample space; a generalized probability assignment itself may also be derived from the structure of an interval probability. In this case, the property that the lower interval limit is n-monotone (compare equation (6)) is transferred from the higher level space ðPðVÞ; P › ðVÞÞ to the space ðV; PðVÞÞ: In particular, this means Proposition 3.7. Let Bel › ð·Þ : P › ðVÞ ! R be a belief function on the measurable space ðPðVÞ; P › ðVÞÞ; M › the structure of the corresponding F-probability field, and
the generalized basic probability assignment derived from elements of M › via equation (9). Then Lð·Þ, the lower interval limit of the resulting F-probability field F ðS M › Þ ¼ ðV; PðVÞ; Lð·ÞÞ; is a belief function on the measurable space ðV; PðVÞÞ; and
Proof. To show equation (20), it may be helpful to start by noting explicitly that, for every A [ PðVÞ; the corresponding set PðAÞ is an element of P › ðVÞ; and so the expression on the right-hand side is well defined. The remaining proof is divided into three parts. In Part (a), LðAÞ $ Bel › ðPðAÞÞ is shown, while Part (b) proves LðAÞ # Bel › ðPðAÞÞ; leading to equation (20) . Finally, in Part (c), it is checked that Lð·Þ is a belief function indeed. Taking equation (20) into account, yields
and equation (6) is shown. A Proposition 3.7 may also be understood as an explanation why belief functions are often judged to be a too restrictive special case of general interval probability. While every belief function is equivalent to a classical probability on the higher level space, general interval probability materially goes beyond classical probability; starting with a classical probability measure on any measurable space, belief accumulation will never lead to general F-probability, even if the process is iterated in the way discussed above. To explain this, consider, for instance, the next higher level, i.e. the measurable space P › ðVÞ; P fi ðVÞ À Á ; with P fi ðVÞ U PðPðPðVÞÞÞ: Assigning a classical probability on this space will lead to a belief function on the measurable space PðVÞ; P › ðVÞ À Á ; and-by Proposition 3.7-inevitably again to a belief function on ðV; PðVÞÞ:
Some special cases
Generalized basic probability assignments allow for high flexibility in modeling complex uncertainty. At least two rich approaches to generalized basic probability assignments can be distinguished: the first one takes S as a finite set. The second applies theories developed for sets of mass functions on V as powerful techniques to construct the generalized basic probability assignment S and to derive efficient procedures for generalized belief accumulation.
Note further that, if one was relying on the Dempster-Shafer theory, one would be forced to assign a basic probability number to every element of PðVÞ. In contrast, generalized basic probability assignments allow for partial specification. Therefore, for instance, a "vague" description of the sample space V is possible by introducing a residual category and leaving the corresponding basic probability number unspecified.
Aggregation of several basic probability assignments
Firstly assume S to consist of q different basic probability assignments in the classical sense, the judgements of q experts, say. While within the Dempster-Shafer approach this information has to be mixed to produce a single basic probability assignment, Theorem 3.2 allows for an appealing alternative: Generalized belief accumulation aggregates the assignments in a way that reflects potential conflict in the different judgements.
Note that also an analogous aggregation of several generalized basic probability assignments S, i ¼ 1, . . ., q, is possible in this framework by considering S ¼ < q i¼1 S i :
Linear partial basic probability assignments
Under the name "linear partial information", in a series of publications Kofler and Menges (see, in particular, Kofler and Menges (1976) and Kofler (1989) ) have considered sets of probabilities described by linear restrictions. Transferring this concept to the space PðVÞ; P › ðVÞ À Á ; a rather flexible modelling is permitted.
Definition 4.1. A generalized basic probability assignment S is called linear partial basic probability assignment if there exists a matrix Y and a vector b such that
As in the example below, linear partial basic probability assignments often arise naturally from qualitative statements on the available information. Among the most promising examples are comparative basic probability assignments derived from statements of the kind m(A) # m(B) for some events A and B. ("The information supporting properly A is not weighted higher than that supporting properly B").
Linear partial basic probability assignments are convex polyhedra. Therefore, generalized belief accumulation can be done simply by linear programming or, according to Theorem 3.6, directly by using the set EðSÞ of extreme points, which is now finite. EðSÞ can be calculated by standard routines from linear programming, and in some important special cases, even explicit expressions for the vertices are available. For instance, for comparative basic probability assignments one can directly transfer the results of Kofler (1989, p. 26) to the situation under consideration.
Also, of particular interest is the case where a generalized basic probability assignment is given in form of intervals like m _ ðAÞ # mðAÞ # mðAÞ; A [ PðVÞ:
This leads to so-called probability intervals on PðVÞ; P › ðVÞ À Á ; and the whole framework developed in Weichselberger and Pöhlmann (1990) and de Campos et al. 1994 can be utilized here. In particular, by adopting Weichselberger and Pöhlmann (1990, Theorem 2.5, p. 25), one obtains an explicit expression for generalized belief accumulation:
The computational complexity is of the same order as it is in Dempster -Shafer theory, but the number of situations which can be modelled in a more appropriate way is incomparably higher.
A toy example for a linear partial basic probability assignment
A patient is supposed to suffer from one of three mutually exclusive diseases A, B, C. Let a medical expert summarize his diagnosis in the following way.
1. None of the three diseases can be excluded with certainty. 2. My weight for the symptoms solely pointing on A is at least as high as that on C. 3. My weight on B is between twice and three times as high as that on disease A. 4. At least half of the total weight is given to the information excluding C, but can not be divided among A and B.
This statement can be transferred immediately into linear restrictions: While Dempster -Shafer theory can not cope adequately with this information, a linear partial basic probability assignment is deduced in a straightforward way. For example, with d ¼ 0.1 one arrives, after having determined the vertices of the polyhedron arising from these inequalities, at 
Concluding remarks
Relying on sets of basic probability assignments, the paper proposed a general method to deal with uncertain knowledge. While single basic probability assignments correspond to belief functions, generalized basic probability assignments lead to the richer class of F-probability. The theory of general interval probability can be used for efficient calculations (figure 1). By the possibility of applying theories for sets of mass functions as techniques for generalized basic probability assignments a broad field of flexible modelling was opened, but only briefly sketched. Further interesting results can be derived by detailed investigations of more complex procedures of these theories. A particular fruitful area of application should be decision making under partial knowledge, where recently powerful algorithms based on linear programming have become available (Augustin (2002 (Augustin ( , 2004 ).
The method presented here is general. In principle, it can be used to extend all derived concepts of Dempster -Shafer theory. Another promising aspect is the analogous generalization of other approaches to uncertainty (like possibility theory) which formally can be embedded into Dempster -Shafer theory. The necessary formal framework is given above, the inherent meanings and interpretations in terms of each concept must be developed carefully case by case. Figure 1 . The modelling of uncertain knowledge quantified by basic probability assignments and generalized basic probability assignments.
